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Abstract—The security and privacy of patient information is 
one of the biggest hindrances to the wide adoption of eHealth 
systems. For eHealth systems to be successful they must 
provide protection for patients’ privacy while ensuring 
healthcare professionals are able to access the information 
necessary to provide appropriate care. Accountable-eHealth 
systems are a proposed solution to these potentially competing 
concerns by enforcing appropriate use and after-the-fact 
accountability measures. We have developed a Web-based 
prototype to demonstrate scenarios of how both appropriate 
and inappropriate use of patient information would be handled 
in an Accountable-eHealth system. 
Keywords-Access Control; electronic health records; eHR; 
eHealth; privacy; security 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The proliferation of eHealth, worldwide, is greatly 
hindered by information privacy concerns [1, 2]. Although 
healthcare information has been stored en masse in the past 
in the form of paper records, information privacy concerns 
seem more prolific in the modern electronic society; mainly 
because consumers have a perception that information stored 
in electronic form is more susceptible to misuse through 
external data breaches and internal rogue-users [3]. The use 
of paper records are mainly governed by accepted ethical 
conduct of healthcare professionals and a data breach would 
be a physical loss of records or an act of vandalism. On the 
other hand, data in electronic form can be misused in a 
number of ways that may affect a patient’s financial status, 
employability, insurability and harm their social status. 
These information privacy concerns are justified by events 
that have occurred in recent times with regards to electronic 
health records (EHR) in several countries [4-10].  
External data breaches can be prevented using 
appropriate security protocols, which prevent unauthorized 
entities from accessing the system. However, preventing data 
misuse by internal users, i.e. authorized users, is a 
challenging undertaking. This challenge is further augmented 
in a complex domain such as healthcare. Although a purely 
preventive approach would be appropriate in many other 
domains such as finance, healthcare professionals cannot 
always be denied information that may hold the key to 
making a lifesaving decision. In fact, it has been shown that 
the lack of adequate information is a contributor to 
medication and clinical errors [11]. Thus, healthcare 
professionals demand easy and timely access to as much 
information as possible to make well-informed clinical 
decisions [11]. On the other end of the scale however, 
patients demand control of their health information, giving 
them the capability to determine for themselves “Who can 
view what?” in their eHealth records. Countries like 
Australia have recognized this need and have implemented a 
new eHealth system, the Personally Controlled Electronic 
Health Record (PCEHR), but with the sacrifice of healthcare 
professionals not being able to make clinical decisions by 
looking at a patient’s eHealth record alone. As such, it does 
not realize the full benefits that eHealth can offer to its health 
system. 
Essentially, there are two competing concerns which an 
eHealth system must address: patients’ information privacy 
requirements and healthcare professionals’ information 
access requirements. The key to successful implementation 
would therefore depend on how well a balance of these 
competing concerns can be reached. To that end, a new 
genre of eHealth systems have been proposed by Gajanayake 
et al. [12] called Accountable-eHealth (AeH) systems. It is 
expected that AeH systems would achieve this elusive 
balance of requirements and enable eHealth to deliver the 
full benefits to the healthcare industry. However, AeH 
systems face numerous implementation challenges in three 
main areas; technological, legal and socio-technical. With 
regards to the technological challenges, three main aspects 
have been identified: creating appropriate information usage 
policies, formal policy representation, and policy reasoning. 
This paper presents a Web-based prototype and 
architecture that demonstrates the technological functionality 
of AeH systems, which includes policy formulation and 
representation, information access and use, and policy 
reasoning. A series of case scenarios are modelled into the 
system to give the users an experience of the functionalities 
of AeH systems. 
In what follows, an overview of Accountable-eHealth 
systems is given first in section II. In section III, the 
architecture of the demo prototype is discussed with the 
technical details. Section IV presents a series of case 
scenarios that demonstrates the functionality of AeH 
systems. In Section V, related work is discussed, and Section 
VI concludes the paper with a discussion of future work. 
II. ACCOUNTABLE-EHEALTH SYSTEMS 
This section gives an overview of accountability systems 
in general and discusses the protocols of AeH systems [12], 
thus laying the foundations for the prototype and case 
scenarios that follow.  
A. Accountability systems 
The main goal of accountability systems is to be non-
restrictive. Legitimate users are provided with the 
information they require for their job functions without rigid 
access restrictions. As a result, appropriate use of 
information is implemented, which is achieved by deterring 
users from intentionally misusing information. A fear of 
being caught is delivered with the presence of accountability 
mechanisms, which are appropriately conveyed to the users 
by means of internal messages. Incentives are given to the 
users to follow the procedures and enforce appropriate use. 
Accountability systems intend to increase consumer trust by 
implementing appropriate use and accountability measures. 
B. Accountable-eHealth (AeH) system protocols 
By implementing non-restrictive access to information 
for legitimate users, AeH systems fulfill the information 
requirements of healthcare professionals. They provide 
disincentives for misuse to users which take the form of 
accountability entailed by penalties [13]. It is expected that 
when users are aware of the accountability measures, they 
would not engage in inappropriate activities, much like in the 
offline world we live in [14]. Thus, AeH systems allow 
information to be made available to legitimate users more 
openly and effectively without threatening patients’ 
information privacy. The knowledge of the existence of 
accountability mechanisms and the transparency of system 
activities are incentives for the subjects of the information, 
i.e. patients, to increase their trust in the system. 
Three types of users are modeled in our system; a central 
health authority (HA), patients, and healthcare professionals 
(HCP). The health authority is the governing authority 
responsible for managing the EHR system and managing 
rights of its employees. It defines default access levels for 
each HCP depending on their healthcare/professional role. 
The patients nominate their preferred HCPs and define their 
own access policies for each of them. Using a predefined 
protocol [15], the two policies are combined such that the 
final operational policy assigned for each HCP satisfies both 
the patient’s privacy requirements and the information 
requirements of that HCP. Those who have been nominated 
by a patient will lodge usage requests containing the required 
data types and the intended purpose(s) for access. These 
requests are processed using a knowledgebase containing 
EHR data types and related purposes. Transaction logs are 
kept of all activities of data access and are used for after-the-
fact accountability purposes. In the event of a possible 
misuse of a patient’s health information by a HCP, the 
patient is capable of lodging an inquiry to the relevant 
healthcare professional asking for a justification for his 
actions. The HCP is then required to provide a justification 
for the particular usage. If the HCP fails to provide a valid 
justification, he is held accountable for the ramifications of 
his actions in a predefined legal framework, which is outside 
the scope of this paper. A use case of the above protocols is 
shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Proposed access control architecture [12] 
III. A DEMO ARCHITECTURE 
The implemented AeH system prototype was developed 
as a sample Web-based EHR system. The prototype was 
developed primarily using PHP and JavaScript. The system 
provides patients with the ability to set access policies on 
their HCPs, review access logs for their EHR information, 
submit inquiries for potential misuse, and review responses 
from HCPs. It provides HCPs with the ability to access their 
patient’s EHR information, and respond to inquiries into 
potential misuse from their patient to justify their actions. 
Figure 2 shows the architecture of the system and the 
flow between users and services in the system. The major 
components are the policy aggregation, access control 
service, transaction logs, and the semantic policy reasoner. 
Each of these components will be detailed in this section. 
 
Figure 2.  Demo architecture of an AeH system [16] 
A. Access Policies Aggregation 
The AeH prototype provides a simple interface for 
patients to change the access policies of their HCPs. 
Through this interface they can restrict access to specific 
areas of their EHR, such as sexual health or mental health 
data. While patients are able to control which HCPs should 
be able to access which information, default policies set by 
the HA ensure that the required access levels are always 
given to the appropriate HCPs without unnecessarily 
impeding the patients’ privacy requirements. To accomplish 
this, we aggregate the patient’s policy with the HA policy 
for that HCP to produce a combined policy. 
Developing an appropriate method to represent and 
manipulate usage policies is one of the main technical 
challenges when implementing AeH systems [17]. In the 
AeH prototype, we made use of an Open Standard Digital 
Rights Management (DRM) technology as a novel solution 
to this problem. There are a number of DRM policy 
languages such as the Extensible Access Control Markup 
Language (XAML), Enterprise Privacy Authorization 
Language (EPAL), and the Open Digital Rights Language 
(ODRL). We chose ODRL [18] to represent information 
usage policies in our framework because it is independent of 
implementation constraints and is capable of expressing a 
wide range of policy-based information. 
Figure 3 shows an example policy for a sexual health 
specialist’s access to a patient’s record that gives them 
access to the patient’s EHR while restricting their access to 
the patient’s mental health history. The conflict attribute 
shows that there was a conflict between the patient’s and the 
HA’s policies where the patient tried to restrict access to 
information the HCP required to provide appropriate care. 
By keeping track of conflicts in the amalgamated policy, we 
can make it clear to the patient that the HCP will still be 
allowed to access information they tried to restrict access to. 
Likewise, the AeH prototype gives a warning to HCPs 
accessing such information that the patient prefers they did 
not view that part of their EHR, allowing them to take extra 
care to inform their patient of why they require access to 
that information. 
B. Access Control Service 
When HCPs attempt to view entries in a patient’s EHR, 
a request is made to the access control service to compare 
the access request with the access policy. The Access 
Control Service sits between the EHR data and the user, 
enforcing the patient’s access policies. It makes use of the 
aggregated policies and the context of the request provided 
by the HCP to determine whether they should be allowed 
access to the patient’s information, and sends data on all 
requests to the logging service. For entries the HCP is 
permitted to view, they are immediately presented with the 
information. The access will be logged as valid and no 
notification will be sent to the patient. However, if the 
service determines that they are not allowed to access that 
particular piece of information, a warning will be displayed 
that provides the HCP with the option to view the entries, 
stating that their access to that information is necessary. If 
they continue on to view the entries, the access request will 
be logged as invalid and a notification will be sent to the 
patient so they can review the details and inquire about 
potential misuse. 
 
Figure 3.  An example access policy represented in ODRL 
C. Transaction Logs 
A key component of the AeH system is context aware 
logging of information accesses. In the prototype, all 
information access by HCPs is logged and made available in 
a user-friendly format to patients. When an invalid access 
request is made, the patient is notified of the potential 
misuse of their eHealth data, and they will be able to review 
all the access logs for their EHR. 
Log entries contain information on which HCP accessed 
the data, the date and time of the access, the context of the 
request (patient visit, consultation, etc.), and whether the 
access was policy-compliant. The interface provides options 
for the patient to either mark invalid access requests as OK, 
if they are satisfied the HCP was not misusing their 
information, or submit an inquiry requesting the HCP justify 
their actions. 
 
 
Figure 4.  A transaction log entry represented in ODRL 
Figure 4 shows an ODRL representation of a log entry. 
It is important that all log entries store the usage policy as it 
was at the time of information access, in order to provide 
the patient and the reasoner with appropriate context for 
deciding whether there may have been misuse. 
D. Semantic Reasoner 
When a patient submits an inquiry into a potential 
misuse of their data, the relevant HCP is notified and is 
required to respond to the inquiry and justify their actions. 
The response must include a reason as to why they 
superseded the patient’s access policy and accessed data that 
they were not allowed to. 
When the HCP responds, it is run through a reasoner, 
which makes use of rules defined by the HA along with the 
information stored in the log entry to determine whether the 
HCP’s response is an appropriate reason to override a 
patient’s access policy. The reasoner takes into account the 
type of data accessed, the HCP’s role, the context under 
which the information was accessed, and the reason 
provided by the HCP. 
In the prototype, the HCP selects from predefined 
reasons to simplify the analysis, however, future work will 
make use of natural language processing to allow more 
verbose responses from HCPs. They are also able to enter a 
comment that will be visible to patients, communicating 
their reasons. 
If the reasoner determines the HCP’s response is valid, 
the patient will be notified of this and given the option to 
request an investigation by the HA if they are not satisfied 
by the response. If, however, the reasoner determines that 
the response is not valid, the HA will be notified to 
investigate the situation to determine if any misuse has 
occurred. The patient will also be notified that the access 
will be investigated by the HA. 
IV. CASE SCENARIO 
In testing the implemented prototype, a number of 
expected scenarios were developed to demonstrate the 
functionality of the AeH system. In this section, we describe 
three such scenarios that demonstrate different hypothetical 
situations and outcomes. 
The scenarios involve the following characters: 
 Patient X: Our protagonist. This patient has 
two different HCPs they see for different 
specialisations. 
 Dr. S: Patient X’s dermatologist. Patient X has 
given them access to their EHR but restricted 
Dr. S’s access to their sexual and mental health 
information. However, the HA has set a policy 
requiring that dermatologists have access to 
sexual health information due to the relation 
between the two fields. 
 Dr. Y: Patient X’s sexual health specialist. 
They have been given access to Patient X’s 
EHR but have been restricted from accessing 
the patient’s mental health history. 
A. Scenario 1 
In Scenario 1, Dr. S accesses Patient X’s EHR during a 
visit to their office. They access the patient’s dermatology 
history and, due to the nature of the patient’s issue, sexual 
health history. When accessing the patient’s sexual health 
history, Dr. S is notified that the patient had set a preference 
preferring that their sexual health history was not accessed. 
Seeing this, they explain to Patient X that the skin issue is 
related to a sexual health related condition, and so a review 
of their sexual health records is necessary to provide 
adequate care. This complies with the patient’s access 
policy, so the access is logged as OK with no active 
notification to the patient. 
Figure 5 shows the warning screen Dr. S would see 
before being allowed to access Patient X’s sexual health 
records. 
B. Scenario 2 
In Scenario 2, Patient X, who believes they may have 
contracted an STD, visits Dr. Y. During the consultation, 
Dr. Y accesses the patient’s sexual health information, 
which is policy-compliant. However, during the 
consultation, Patient X begins to have a mental breakdown. 
Forced to take some action, Dr. Y overrides the patient’s 
access policy and views their mental health history for 
anything that can help in the situation. As this breached the 
policy, it is flagged for review by the patient as shown in 
Figure 6. 
Sometime later, the patient submits an inquiry to Dr. Y 
to explain why their mental health information was 
accessed. Dr. Y responds with a reason that describes the 
mental breakdown the patient suffered during the 
consultation. The reasoner determines this to be a valid 
reason to override the patient’s policy on mental health 
information and notifies the patient of this decision. 
C. Scenario 3 
In Scenario 3, Dr. S is treating Patient X for a skin 
condition and notices behavior that makes him concerned 
about the patient’s mental state. Curious, he accesses the 
patient’s mental health history, overriding the patient’s 
policy to do so. As this is not a policy-compliant 
information access, the AeH system notifies the patient of 
this event for review.  
 
Figure 5.  Warning screen when an access policy conflict exists 
 
Figure 6.  Patient’s EHR access log. 
 
Figure 7.  Dr. Y responding to the patient’s inquiry. 
 
Figure 8.  Access log summary entry 
Patient X reviews the log entry for the access and, 
concerned as to why Dr. S would have needed to view his 
mental health history, submits an inquiry from the interface 
shown in Figure 8. Dr. S responds to the inquiry, stating that 
the information was for use in providing general healthcare 
for the patient. The reasoner determines that this is an 
invalid reason for Dr. S to override a patient’s policy and 
access their mental health information, and notifies the HA. 
The patient is notified of this outcome, with a message 
informing them that the event has been reported and will be 
investigated as a breach of privacy as shown in Figure 9. 
 
Figure 9.  Inquiry review entry after an invalid response from Dr. S. 
D. Scenario 4 
In Scenario 4, Dr. Y has been provided with incentives 
from Patient X’s insurance company to provide them with 
information on the patient’s health record. The insurance 
company wants to have the full details of the patient’s 
medical history before giving them a policy, and makes a 
shady deal with Dr. Y as one of Patient X’s HCPs. Dr. Y 
accesses the patient’s EHR, including their mental health 
history, to collect information to send to the insurance 
company. They give the context of the information request 
as being made during a patient visit. 
As Dr. Y has not been granted access to this information 
by the patient, the system notifies the patient of a potential 
misuse of their data. Upon reviewing the access log entry, 
the patient submits a request for a response from the HCP 
justifying their need to access that information. Dr. Y, in a 
further unethical act, lies in the response, stating it was for 
the purposes of deciding on a possible prescription for the 
patient’s recent treatment that had potential mental health 
side-effects. 
Under the rules specified by the HA, the semantic 
reasoner determines this reasoning to be probably valid, so 
the patient is notified of the response for review. Upon 
reviewing the Dr Y’s response, the patient realizes the time 
of the information access does not match up to their recent 
appointment and Dr. Y had said no prescription was 
necessary. Suspicious, they submit a request for 
investigation into the HCP’s response from the HA by 
simply clicking the relevant link in the log review interface. 
V. RELATED WORK 
eHealth systems can contain sensitive information, and 
as such, it is vital that access to that information is 
appropriately managed. There are numerous issues to 
consider including the security of the stored data, access 
control and access monitoring in EHR systems [19]. 
Traditional preventive approaches to information access 
control that rigidly deny access to users without appropriate 
permissions are alone not enough in complex domains such 
as eHealth, and so a number of researchers have begun 
working on augmenting these preventive measures with 
accountability [13,20,21]. 
With concerns over information dissemination being one 
of the primary causes for patient concerns, it is important 
that it is transparent to patients how their information is 
used and who it will be disclosed to both now and in the 
future [22]. Rodrigues et al. [19] agree stating in regards to 
Cloud based hosting of EHR information that appropriate 
security mechanisms must be put in place while making it 
transparent to patients how their data is managed. 
Transparency is one of the fundamental aspects of 
Information Accountability [20]. 
There have been various proposed approaches to 
implementing IA mechanisms. For example, Jagadeesan et 
al. [23] attempted to develop a formal foundation for the 
design of IA systems using privacy policies to define 
appropriate use of information. They focused on using audit 
logs which can detect potential policy violations and 
information misuse. Weitzner et al. [20] proposed a 
transparent audit process that would track all transactions. 
Their proposal suggests the use of policies combined with 
policy-aware transaction logs and a policy reasoning 
capability to enable systems to hold users of information 
accountable. Sloan et al. [21], using the work by Weitzner et 
al. [20] as a basis, described the challenges of implementing 
accountability systems, both in terms of social and technical 
aspects. These studies generally focus on IA and 
accountable systems from a general point of view without 
consideration for the specific requirements of eHealth 
systems.  
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK  
This paper presented a working prototype of an AeH 
system to demonstrate its functionality and the principles of 
information accountability in eHealth. To further 
demonstrate the potential of AeH systems, we are working 
on extending the functionality and usability of the working 
AeH prototype and integrating it into an existing EHR 
system. Once that has been accomplished, a study to verify 
its practicality and suitability as a solution to patient privacy 
concerns and HCP information access requirements will be 
conducted by having HCPs and patients actually use the 
system, and collecting data on these trials. 
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